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Framing scholarship on policy issues has primarily focused on how competitive message
environments alter framing effects or how individual differences moderate the impact of
frames. This study combines both of these focal areas by examining how individual open-
/closed-mindedness moderates framing effects about climate change within competitive and
noncompetitive framing contexts. Contrary to previous scholarship, our experimental study
finds effects on attitudes in the competitive framing condition, but not the noncompetitive
framing condition. The framing effects found in the competitive condition were contingent
upon individual differences in open-/closed-mindedness. Analysis shows that individual
open-/closed-mindedness influences framing effects in part by altering the effects of frame
exposure on the perceived costs and benefits of government climate policies.
doi:10.1111/jcom.12040
Over the last 20 years, a significant amount of scholarship within the field of
communication has investigated the influence of framed messages on audience
attitudes and behaviors. However, an emerging critique of much of this research
questions its external validity, as experimental participants are typically exposed
to single-sided messages that do not realistically model the competitive message
environments in whichmost individuals are embedded. There is currently a dearth of
research examining how framing effects may operate differently within competitive
message environments compared to noncompetitive environments. Furthermore, to
date, scant research has examined how individual differences may influence message
processing within competitive framing environments.
This study aims to address these gaps in the framing literature by examining how
framingmay influence support for climatemitigationpolicies in both competitive and
noncompetitive message environments. Furthermore, we evaluate how individual
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open-/closed-mindedness may moderate framing effects on decision-making, and
how this moderation may vary across differing degrees of message competition.
Thus, this study combines two parallel tracks of recent framing scholarship that have
attempted to understand the boundaries of framing effects.
Framing andmessage competition
Framing research has emerged across a range of disciplines as an analytical framework
to unpack socially constructed schemas that give meaning to issues or events
by presenting ‘‘a central organizing idea’’ (Gamson & Modogliani, 1989). These
‘‘interpretive packages’’ may provide specific problem definitions, diagnose causes,
and/or suggest solutions for individuals employing those frames when constructing
meaning, processing information, and making evaluations or decisions (Entman,
2004). Framing research has the advantage of explanatory power at both the macro,
or contextual, and micro, or individual, levels of analysis (Benford & Snow, 2000;
Chong & Druckman, 2007a; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007).
At the institutional level of analysis, frames are constructed, tailored, and
communicated by a variety of competing social actors (e.g., politicians, advocacy
organizations, corporations, etc.) (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). These processes
of meaning construction (i.e., framing building) result in competitive frame contests
between social actors attempting to shape public attitudes about an issue, topic, or
event and spur citizen mobilization (Benford & Snow, 2000; Scheufele & Tewks-
bury, 2007). For example, to address climate change advocates for new government
regulations have often focused on potential environmental disasters stemming from
climate change, while opponents of regulation have focused on communicating the
possible economic costs of such regulation (Nisbet, 2009). Linking the macro and
micro, framing theorists have attempted to explicate how these ‘‘frames in communi-
cation’’ are strategically constructed and communicated with the goal of influencing
audiences to use specific interpretive ‘‘frames in thought’’ when making sense of an
issue, topic, or problem (Chong & Druckman, 2007a, p. 106). However, most of the
experimental framing research designed to investigate framing processes and effects
at the microlevel of analysis has failed to take into account the competitive message
environments at themacrolevel of analysis that often surround the topics aboutwhich
framing effects are examined. This lacuna in the literature has been the focus of an
emerging critique by several scholars in recent years who have questioned the external
validity of experimental framing research that does not allow for individuals being
exposed to competing frames simultaneously in ‘‘real world’’ message environments
within its research design (e.g., Borah, 2011b; Chong & Druckman, 2007b, 2007c;
Sniderman & Theriault, 2004).
These critics argue that framing experiments that adopt a ‘‘one-sided’’ message
design testing the effect of a frame compared to a control group or a separate frame
condition overestimate framing effects on attitude change. These critics have, in
turn, demonstrated that framing effects may be diminished or altogether negated
when audiences are exposed to competing frames, especially when audiences are
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exposed to frames of similar argumentative strength (Borah, 2011b; Chong and
Druckman, 2007b, 2007c; Sniderman & Theriault, 2004).
Though some studies in recent years have attempted to explicate framing effects
and processes within competitive message contexts (i.e., Borah, 2011b; Chong and
Druckman, 2007c), a recent review of the framing literature (Borah, 2011a) found a
scant number of peer-reviewed studies (only 3.2%of 379 articles analyzed) examining
competitive framing process and effects, demonstrating that further research in this
area is greatly needed. Therefore, in this study we test the hypothesis that exposure to
a framedmessage in a noncompetitivemessage environment will more likely result in
attitude change compared to exposure to a framed message in a competitive message
environment (H1).
Open-/closed-mindedness and attitude change
In addition to message competition, a common area of framing research is how
individual characteristics or traits may moderate framing effects (Borah, 2011a;
Chong and Druckman, 2007a). However, most of these potential moderators of
framing effects have been tested by one-sided framing studies and not with two-sided
studies in a competitive message context (Borah, 2011b). Thus, how individual
differences may moderate framing effects within competitive message contexts is
greatly underresearched.
In this context, we turn our attention to the individual difference variable of
‘‘open-/closed-mindedness,’’ part of an overarching concept known as need for
cognitive closure (Kruglanski, 2004; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). This concept has
the potential to play a significant role in how audiences may process information,
especially when considering political persuasion (Feldman et al., 2012; Holbert &
Hansen, 2006). Need for cognitive closure is defined by Richter and Kruglanski
(2004) as ‘‘a desire for an answer to a question on a given topic, any answer’’ (p. 102).
People who are low in need for cognitive closure can be considered ‘‘open-minded,’’
while those who are high can be considered ‘‘closed-minded’’ (Kruglanski, 2004). In
general, peoplewho are closed-minded aremotivated to process quickly and shallowly
in an effort to draw any acceptable conclusion. In contrast, open-minded people
are motivated to think about as much of the available data as they can, appreciate
ambiguity, and enjoy drawing out the decision process (Kruglanski, 2004).
In terms of persuasion and attitude change, people who are closed-minded, as
compared to those who are open-minded, tend to support the status quo and are
more resistant to change (Jost & Hunyady, 2005; Sinatra, Kardash, Taasoobshirazi,
& Lombardi, 2011), are less likely to be persuaded under conditions where they have
a prior opinion base (Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993), and also tend to require
a smaller amount of information in order to make decisions (Choi, Koo, Choi, &
Auh, 2008). Kruglanski (2004) describes the closed-minded as engaging in a process
in which they might briefly consider the arguments and then stop as soon as an
acceptable conclusion is reached, or in other cases simply seize on prior opinions and
discount new information thatmay be inconsistent. On the other hand, open-minded
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individuals are more likely to examine all aspects of a topic before making a decision
and to process information more systematically. Based on this research, therefore, in
general we should expect that individual open-/closed-mindedness will moderate the
influence of message frames on attitude change, such that attitude change is more
likely to occur among open-minded individuals (H2).
Framing climate change and open-/closed-mindedness
Beyond testing our first two hypotheses, we also aim to examine how our two sets of
variables, contextual factors (message competition) and individual differences (open-
/closed-mindedness), intersect to influence attitudinal responses to message frames.
For this examination we have selected the policy issue of climate change mitigation.
Over the past several years the political discourse around the issue of climate change
mitigation has been dominated by competing messages over the environmental,
energy, and economic consequences of proposed government policies (Moser, 2010;
Nisbet, 2009) and thus is an apt case study for understanding opinion formation
within a competitive framing environment.
Furthermore, this frame contest has resulted in polarized public opinion about the
issue, with support or opposition to climate changemitigation commonly dependent
on whether individuals focus on the perceived costs or benefits of addressing climate
change (Kahn and Kotchen, 2010; Sunstein, 2006; Weber, 2010). Therefore, we posit
the perceived costs and benefits of government action on climate change mitigation
will mediate the relationship between message frame exposure and attitudes about
climate change policies (H3).
Previous scholarship also suggests that open-/closed-mindedness may specifically
influence attitude formationwithin competitivemessage environments. For example,
Chong and Druckman (2007b) argue that competitive message environments are
more likely to ‘‘stimulate individuals to deliberate on the merits of alternative
interpretations’’ (p. 651), which is more likely to happen among open-minded
individuals than closed-minded, according to Kruglanski (2004). In other words,
confirmation bias is less likely to occur among open-minded individuals in a
competitive message environment as they are more likely to attend to and process a
greater amount of available information, rather than seizing on a smaller amount of
information that aligns with or confirms pre-existing attitudes.
In addition, open-/closed-mindedness may influence how audiences attend to
competing message frames about climate change. Richter and Kruglanski (2004)
suggest a relationship between need for closure and risk aversion, in that they argue
that people who are induced to have a high need for closure due to time constraints
or cognitive load become more risk averse. There is a possibility, therefore, that
people who are high in need for cognitive closure may weigh the costs more than the
benefits, even when costs are not objectively very high. In fact, people in general tend
to be risk and loss averse, meaning that the costs tend to outweigh the benefits in a
decision-making process even if the rational choice is to choose the side with more
benefits (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). Thus, when considering competing message
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frames about climate change mitigation, open-minded individuals are more likely
to perceive the benefits of climate change mitigation compared to closed-minded
individuals—and therefore closed-minded individuals are more likely to prefer
the status quo (H4). Taken together, H3 and H4 represent a moderated-mediation
model of framing effects on audience attitudes about climate change policies (e.g.,
Hart & Nisbet, 2012; Preacher et al., 2007). This model occurs when an audience
predisposition (i.e., open-/closed-mindedness) moderates the influence of message
exposure on an intervening mediating variable (i.e., perceived costs-benefits of
climate changemitigation) on our dependent variable of interest (i.e., climate change
mitigation policy).
Method
Research stimulus
For our study we created three 45-second videos that communicated common
message frames found on both sides of the debate about climate change policy in the
United States. By using a video, rather than textual, stimulus we aimed to create a set
of ‘‘natural’’ message frames, as television serves as the primary channel of political
communication in the United States. Two pro-climate change mitigation videos
were created, one framed in terms of environmental disaster (i.e., melting ice caps,
animal extinction, etc.) and the other framed in terms of national security (i.e., energy
independence, global instability, terrorism, etc.) (see Moser, 2010; Nisbet, 2009;
Zia & Todd, 2010). Though each pro-climate mitigation message frame emphasized
different negative impacts of climate change andbenefits of climate changemitigation,
they both had the same proposed solution to the identified problem—government
action on climate change mitigation (i.e., gas tax, regulation of carbon emissions,
investment in alternative energy, etc.). Including two different pro-climatemitigation
framing videos in the stimulus conditions was meant to increase the generalizability
of the experiment, as any observed effects from the stimulus are not necessarily due
to any one message frame.
A third video was created that emphasized the negative economic costs and impact
of proposed government regulations or expenditures on alternative energy and
argued against any government action on climate change mitigation (Nisbet, 2009).
Each of these interpretative packages was designed tomanipulate what considerations
were most applicable when considering what the government should do about the
problem of climate change.
The videos did not identify any specific sponsor or source so as not to provide
any cues that may bias audience information processing. In the noncompetitive and
competitive conditions respondents were asked to watch either one or two videos
‘‘about global warming and what the government should or should not do about it,’’
again with no specific source or sponsor mentioned in any of the conditions. Finally,
the same voice narrator was used in all three videos to further reduce the likelihood of
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any variances in perceived message source. Interested readers can access the stimulus
videos on the file sharing service, YouTube.1
Research design
We investigated the hypotheses with a two-wave survey experiment that utilized a
nationally representative population sample, administered by the survey firmKnowl-
edge Networks (KN) on behalf of the authors through their internet panel. Their vol-
untary surveypanelwas createdbyKNthrougha combinationof randomdigit-dialing
(RDD) and address-based sample procedures (ABS) with all individuals who become
part of their internet panel being providedwith computer hardware or Internet access
as needed (more information can be found at http://www.knowledgenetworks.com).
Wave one of the experiment administered a pretest questionnaire assessing base-
line attitudes and knowledge about global warming and climate change mitigation
policies to a random sample of online panelists. Approximately 4weeks later, par-
ticipants from wave 1 were contacted and randomly assigned to one of two stimulus
conditions (noncompetitive message environment, competitive message environ-
ment), or a control condition. In the noncompetitivemessage condition, participants
viewed a 45-second video promoting government climate change policies, framed
either in terms of ‘‘environmental disaster’’ or ‘‘national security,’’ followed by
a posttest questionnaire evaluating attitude change about climate mitigation. In
the competitive message condition, participants viewed one or the other of the
pro-climate mitigation videos, but they also viewed a second video arguing against
government action on climate mitigation framed in terms of ‘‘economic disaster,’’
again followedby aposttest questionnaire. In addition, the order of videopresentation
within the competitive conditionwas randomized for participants. In the control con-
dition, participants did not watch any video and simply completed a questionnaire.
Overall, the research design maximized the balance between internal and external
validity by randomly assigning adult participants to message conditions, simulating
noncompetitive or competitive message environments about climate change, and
exposing participants to realistic strategic messages commonly employed by many
policy actors. Our randomized control-group pretest-posttest design with amultiple-
week interval between pretest and posttest provided the optimal means for assessing
the influence of the stimuli on attitude change while controlling for pre-existing
attitudes and avoiding any sensitizing or priming effects of the pretest that might
bias the results. In total, 594 participants completed both waves of the experiment
while those participants who (a) only completed the first wave of the experiment, (b)
reported an inability to properly view or hear the videos, (c) failed to play the videos
on their computers as tracked by Knowledge Networks, or (d) incorrectly answered
a survey question about the topic of the video being excluded from the analysis.
Measured variables
Several control variables were included in the analyses to ensure any observed
differences between treatment groups were not due to significant differences in
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group characteristics or traits including measures of sociodemographics, political
ideology, factual knowledge about climate change, and belief in human induced
climate change.2
In terms of focal variables, open-/closed-mindedness was measured in the study
by utilizing three measures from the closed-mindedness component of Kruglanski’s
(2004) need for closure scale. Participants were asked on the first wave of the study
whether they agreed on a 4-point scale with three statements and their answers
combined into one index, with open-mindedness coded high (M = 8.5, SD= 1.3,
α= .60).3 In addition, we coded with dichotomous variables whether participants
were in the competitive (35%) or the noncompetitive (36%) message conditions.
An indicator of whether the pro-climate mitigation message was framed in terms
of the environment or national security was also included in the analysis, with the
environment coded high (35%).
As part of the study design, in both waves of the experiment we asked participants
on 7-point Likert scales how costly or how beneficial (each as separate questions) they
believed government efforts would be in addressing the problem of climate change
(ranging from not costly/not beneficial at all to extremely costly/beneficial). For both
waves of the study we created a single measure of perceived cost-benefit calculus by
subtracting the perceived cost of government climate change mitigation efforts from
the perceived benefits for a score that ranged from −6 to 6 that scored perceived
benefits high (wave 1, M =−1.06, SD= 2.79; wave 2, M =−1.37, SD= 2.6).
The dependent variable in the analysis was participant attitudes about government
policies on climate changemitigation. Participantswere askedwhether they supported
or opposed (on 7-point Likert scales) eight different policy options promoting
climate change mitigation and their responses combined into one additive index,
with support for government policies promoting climate change mitigation coded
high.4 The questions were asked on the first wave of the survey (M = 32.4, SD= 10.5,
α= .85) and then again on the second wave of the survey (M = 33.2, SD= 10.7,
α= .88) after message exposure.
Results
Manipulation check
In order to assess whether the framing manipulations successfully influenced the
applicability of the considerations audiences employ to form an opinion about
climate change mitigation, a manipulation check was conducted. Participants were
asked to rank order five sets of considerations about government policy on climate
change both in the pretest and posttest.5 Analysis of the results demonstrated that
controlling for sociodemographics and wave one responses, participants in the
noncompetitive national security condition ranked national security considerations
more applicable, t(562)= 3.408, p≤ .01, than the control condition. However,
applicability of national security was not significantly different from the control
condition in the competitive condition. Likewise, participants in the noncompetitive
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environmental disaster condition believed environmental considerations were
significantly more applicable compared to the control condition, t(562)= 2.340,
p≤ .05, but did not differ significantly from control in the competitive environmental
disaster condition. Furthermore, we examined whether the applicability of economic
cost of climate change mitigation considerations significantly differed across the
conditions, t(562)= 0.082, p= n.s., and they did not. This pattern of results is
consistent with Chong and Druckman’s (2007b) findings regarding the influence of
noncompetitive vs. competitive frame exposure on applicability.
We also attempted to evaluate the ‘‘strength’’ of the competing frames by asking
respondents how ‘‘credible’’ they found the videos they viewed, each on a 5-point
Likert scale. A paired-samples T-test determined the difference betweenmean ratings
of credibility for the environmental disaster frame (M = 3.0, SD= 1.3) and the
economic costs frame (M = 2.9, SD= 1.2) was not significant, t(80)= 0.766, p= n.s.
Neither was the difference, t(75)= 1.168, p= n.s., between the mean credibility
rating of the national security frame (M = 2.8, SD= 1.1) and the economic costs
frame (M = 2.7, SD= 1.0). These results reassure us that subjects in the competitive
frame condition perceived the message frames as having relative equal credibility, as
an indicator of ‘‘strength,’’ and thus any observed differences between the conditions
were not based on either the pro- or anti-climate change mitigation frames being
viewed as fundamentally more ‘‘credible’’ than the other.
Analyses
In all our analyses, OLS regression was employed to test our hypotheses and research
question. We employed OLS regression in order to avoid the increased risk of
type I and type II errors that can occur when continuous independent variables
are converted into categorical variables for use in analysis of variance (ANOVA)
tests (see Hayes, 2005, pp. 473–479 for discussion). First, it was tested whether
support for climate mitigation differed as a result of viewing a strategic framing
message alone or in competition with another message. Individual’s support for
climate mitigation—the dependent variable—was measured at two time points
and therefore, models predicted individual’s support for climate mitigation at the
second time point, controlling for the individual’s opinion at the first time point
(see Cohen et al., 2003). Results thus demonstrate whether there is evidence that
the framing messages were associated with attitude change between the pretest and
posttest.
In this first OLS regression model, results showed that there were no differences
between those who viewed a pro-climate change mitigation change video and those
who did not view any video, regardless of whether the announcement was shown
alone (the noncompetitive framing condition, b=−.108, p= n.s., see Table 1, Model
1) or in conjunction with an anti-climate change mitigation policy message frame
(the competitive framing condition, b= .362, p= n.s.), disconfirming H1. Apart
from an individual’s prior level of support for climate mitigation policy, political
ideology and whether an individual believed in human induced climate change were
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Table 1 Results of Models Predicting a Change in Support for Climate Change Mitigation
Policy
Model 1 Model 2
Intercept 10.307** 12.546***
Education – .148 – .151
Age .012 .013
Female – .295 – .238
Income .052 .051
White – .013 – .155
Political ideology – .721*** – .643**
Knowledge about climate change – .238 – .280
Belief in human induced climate change 1.264* 1.296*
Open-mindedness (mean-centered) .197 – .317
Theme .734 .737
Wave 1 support for climate policy .811*** .816***
Competitivea .362 .364
Noncompetitivea – .108 – .036
Competitive* open-mindedness — 1.136*
Noncompetitive* open-mindedness — .358
R2 (wave 2 support for climate mitigation) .778 .781
Note: All entries are unstandardized regression coefficients (b).
aControl condition is the reference category.
*p< .05. **p< .01. ***p< .001.
the only significant factors predicting an individual’s support for climate mitigation
policy; unsurprisingly, individuals who believed in human-induced climate change
(b= 1.264, p≤ .05) and who were more politically liberal (b= 1.264, p≤ .001) were
more supportive of climate change mitigation policy.
We also examined whether there was any evidence supporting our second
hypothesis (H2), that the effect of viewing a message differs according to the open-
/closed-mindedness of an individual. Our second OLS regression model shows that
the effect of viewing a message frame promoting government action on climate
change, when it was in competition with an anti-climate change mitigation message,
depended upon the open-/closed-mindedness of an individual, b= 1.136, p≤ .05,
see Table 1, Model 2, and Figure 1. There was no evidence that the effect of viewing a
climate change PSA by itself—the noncompetition condition—depended on open-
/closed-mindedness, b= .358, p= n.s. Among individuals who were relatively more
open-minded (individuals at one standard deviation above the mean for open-
/closed-mindedness), viewing a climate change mitigation video in competition
with an anti-climate change video resulted in more support for climate change
mitigation policy than those in the control condition, b= 2.032, p≤ .05. There was
no difference between those in the control condition and those in the competitive
condition among people at the mean level of open-/closed-mindedness or among
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Figure 1 Effect of open-mindedness across framing conditions. Note: Support for climate
mitigation policy scale ranged from 8 to 32.
those who were relatively closed-minded. In sum, these results show that viewing
a pro-mitigation video paired with an anti-mitigation video can shift opinions to
be more supportive of climate change policy among those who are open-minded,
supporting H2, but no evidence of significant attitude change among either open- or
closed-minded participants in the noncompetitive condition, disconfirming H1.
Finally, in order to evaluate our third and fourth hypotheses about the relationship
between open-/closed-mindedness, perceived costs/benefits, and attitude change we
evaluated whether an individual’s assessment of the costs verses the benefits of
government climate change mitigation policy was a mediating variable between
message exposure and climate change attitudes. In other words, did competitive
message exposure lead to a change in an individual’s cost-benefit calculus about
government action on climate change, which in turn led to a change in attitude about
government climate change mitigation policy? In addition, we assessed whether the
perceived cost-benefit calculus was amoderated-mediator of the relationship between
competitive message exposure and attitude change by evaluating the influence of
message exposure on an individual’s cost-benefit calculus varied by their degree
of open-/closed-mindedness. In order to test these relationships we employed the
MODMED SPSS macro as described in Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes (2007).
Results of the analysis demonstrate that thepro-climate changemitigationmessage
effect on attitude change in the competitive environment is at least partially carried
through individual’s assessment of the cost-benefit calculus (supporting H3), but
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Table 2 Results of Moderated Mediation Models Predicting Change in Climate Change
Mitigation Policy Support
Mediator
C/B calculus Costs Benefits
Equation predicting mediator (Wave 2)
Intercept −1.573* 3.536*** 1.660***
Education – .050 .015 – .042
Age – .002 .005 .002
Female – .168 .053 – .118
Income .000 – .006 – .008
White – .162 .092 – .090
Political ideology – .241*** .124** – .130**
Knowledge about climate change .014 .040 .037
Belief in human induced climate change .034 .059 .134
Open-mindedness (mean centered) – .106 .002 – .115
Theme – .181 .030 – .164
Wave 1 support for climate change mitigation policy .082*** – .024*** .067***
Wave 1 mediator .377*** .286*** .330***
Competitiveb – .1014 .086 .013
Noncompetitiveb – .070 .205 .154
Competitive* open-mindedness .352* – .088 .283**
Noncompetitive* open-mindedness .131 .020 .167
Equation predicting support for climate change mitigation policy (Wave 2)
Intercept 11.531*** 11.552*** 6.705***
Education – .078 – .144 – .074
Age .022 .016 .018
Female – .130 – .229 – .134
Income .065 .052 .080
White .020 – .127 – .036
Political ideology – .404* – .587** – .462*
Knowledge about climate change – .252 – .253 – .327a
Belief in human induced climate change 1.051a 1.284* .718
Open-mindedness (mean centered) – .266 – .336 – .226
Theme .955a .757 1.039*
Wave 1 mediator – .061 – .037 – .036
Wave 2 mediator .816*** – .316a 1.363***
Wave 1 support for climate change mitigation policy .714*** .806*** .680***
Competitiveb .376 .373 .290
Noncompetitiveb – .044 .006 – .307
Competitive* open-mindedness .881a 1.136* .828a
Noncompetitive* open-mindedness .265 .400 .134
All entries are unstandardized regression coefficients (b).
ap< .10; bControl condition is the reference category.
*p< .05. **p< .01. ***p< .001.
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that the exact nature of how viewing a message frame in a competitive environment
influences support for policy through perception of the cost-benefit calculus is
dependent upon that individual’s level of open-/closed-mindedness (see Table 2), in
answer to H4. For those individuals low in open-mindedness (see Table 3), viewing a
pro-climate change mitigation message in competition with an anti-climate change
mitigation message resulted in a decreased cost-benefit calculus, which then led to a
decline in support for government climate change mitigation policy. For individuals
between one-and-a-half standard deviations below the mean of open-mindedness
and two standard deviations above the mean of open-mindedness, viewing a pro-
climate change mitigation video in competition had no effect on attitudes (either
directly or indirectly through perception of the cost–benefit calculus). At high
levels of open-mindedness (two standard deviations above the mean), there was
evidence that viewing the message frame in competition resulted in a more favorable
cost–benefit calculus, leading to more support for climate change mitigation policy
(see Table 3).
To probe this findingmore deeply, we next conducted separate analyses replacing
the cost–benefit calculus with costs and benefits as the mediator, respectively. These
analyses allow us to see whether viewing a video in competition moves the costs,
the benefits, or both simultaneously. Results are presented in Tables 2 and 3. It
appears that most of the effect observed in the cost–benefits calculus model is
attributable to movement in perceived benefits, rather than in perceived costs. The
indirect effect of viewing a message in competition was never significant through
perceived costs, but the pattern of indirect effects through perceived benefitsmirrored
(even magnified) the effect through the calculus. These data reveal that viewing a
message in competition decreased the perceived benefits among those who were
Table 3 Indirect Effect of Viewing a PSA in Competition (in Comparison to the Control
Condition) on Change in Climate Change Mitigation Policy Support Through Mediators,
at Various Levels of Open-Mindedness
Mediator
Value of open-mindedness Cost–benefit calculus Costs Benefits
Scale minimum (x= 3) −1.664* – .180 −2.105*
3 SD below the mean (x= 4.610) −1.201* – .135 −1.484*
2 SD below the mean (x= 5.907) – .829* – .099 – .984*
1 SD below the mean (x= 7.204) – .439a – .061 – .460a
Mean (x= 8.5017) – .078 – .023 .022
1 SD above the mean (x= 9.799) .281 .008 .505a
2 SD above the mean (x= 11.096) .664a .045 1.019*
Scale maximum (x= 12) .923a .070 1.367*
ap< .10.
*p< .05. **p< .01. ***p< .001.
Journal of Communication 63 (2013) 766–785 © 2013 International Communication Association 777
Framing and Open-Mindedness E. C. Nisbet et al.
less open-minded, resulting in less support for climate change mitigation policy;
on the flip side, among those who were relatedly more open-minded, viewing a
video in competition increased the perceived benefits, resulting in an increase in
support for climate change mitigation policy in comparison to those who saw
no video.
Discussion
Theoretical contributions
Scholarship on framing effects on attitude change in recent years has proceeded along
two tracks (a) focusing on identifying individual differences that may moderate the
effects of frame exposure and (b) examining framing effects within competitive and
noncompetitive information environments. This study uniquely combines these two
areas of scholarship by simulating the competitive framing contest about climate
changemitigation at themacro level of analysis and then evaluating the effects of frame
exposure at the micro, or individual, level of analysis, while simultaneously taking
into account individual differences amongst the audience. Our findings demonstrate
that research asserting that framing effects on attitudes are negated when individuals
are exposed to equally strong competing message frames has an important boundary
condition as framing effects may be contingent upon individual differences—in this
case the relative degree of open-/closed-mindedness of the audience.
Why was our first hypothesis, that attitude change was more likely in the
noncompetitive condition than the competitive condition, rejected? The reason may
be that the longstanding, intense frame competition about climate change has created
such a high degree of opinion polarization and reliance on prior opinions that a
single exposure to commonly employed message frames is generally ineffective at
inducing attitude change about climate changemitigation, even among open-minded
individuals. We suggest that attitude change in the competitive message conditions
appears to result from the interaction of two key factors: (a) the stimulus to process
a wider range of considerations in a deliberative, systematic manner due to the
presentation of two equally strong competing message frames and (b) greater open-
mindedness which lends itself to the processing of larger amounts of information in a
systematic manner, less preference for the status-quo, less risk aversions, and greater
attentiveness to perceived benefits.
In other words, the findings of our study are consistent with the idea that
the competitive framing condition motivates open-minded participants to weigh
the overall benefits of climate change mitigation to a much greater degree than
closed-minded participants, which influenced their overall cost–benefit calculation
regarding climate change policies, and consequently increased their support for gov-
ernment action on climate changemitigation. In contrast, closed-minded individuals
prefer the status-quo, are less open to change, and are more likely to ‘‘seize’’ on initial
opinions in order to avoid systematic deliberation of alternatives, Thus, in our study
examining a highly salient and polarized issue such as climate change, in retrospect it
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is less surprising that closed-minded individuals demonstrate no significant change
in opinion compared to the control group in either set of message conditions.
There are several areas that future research may build on from this study.
For example, as we mentioned climate change mitigation is a highly polarized
political issue with audiences engaging in a high degree of motivated reasoning when
processing information about the topic (Hart & Nisbet, 2012). Future research may
examine how competitive/noncompetitive framing may interact with open-/closed-
mindedness to influence attitude change either (a) when ‘‘strong’’ versus ‘‘weak’’
frames are paired in a competitive message environment rather than ‘‘strong’’ versus
‘‘strong’’ as in this study or (b) around a less ideologically polarizing or salient topic
than climate change.
Second, our study reinforces the need for additional communication research
on the role that open-/closed-mindedness, and other closely related constructs, may
play in opinion formation. For example, greater closed-mindedness has been found
to be positively correlated with such orientations as conservatism, authoritarianism,
intolerance of ambiguity, and dogmatism (e.g., Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway,
2003; Kruglanski, 2004; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). Though some scholars dispute
the positive correlation between closed-mindedness and conservative ideology (i.e.,
Greenberg & Jonas, 2003) by arguing that liberal individuals may equally be closed-
minded, Kruglanski (2004) asserts that individuals with a high need for closure are
attracted specifically to belief systems ‘‘promising stability and inequality’’ more so
than others (p. 148).
In our view the findings of this study and the scholarship on need for closure, and
other similar orientations (i.e., dogmatism, authoritarianism, system justification
theory, etc.), raise two overlapping pathways for future communication research.
First, our study controlled for political ideology and in a post hoc test found
no interactions between ideology and message conditions. This suggests to us that
framing scholars that often focus on values and belief systems as individual differences
that moderate framing/message effects may want to turn their focus to consider a
wider range of more fundamental individual differences such as need for closure,
dogmatism, system justification, etc. This broader focus is especially relevant when
considering frames or issues that focus on questions of stability vs. change, inequality
vs. equality, and risks vs. benefits that are inherent to many critical, environmental,
health, economic, and social issues. In other words, in some cases the moderating
influence of ideology or values on framing and/or message effects may be spurious
and instead be driven by more fundamental orientations like need for closure that
influence individuals to self-select into specific types of belief or value systems that
venerate the status quo or inequality.
A second pathway for communication research is how need for closure is
associated with factual misperceptions or false beliefs. Our increasingly politically
polarized media environment and audience segmentation has led communication
scholars to recently debate the nature of selective attention/exposure andmedia effects
(e.g., Bennett & Iyengar, 2008). Many pundits and policy-makers have lamented
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the growth of ‘‘epistemic closure’’ in policy debates (e.g., Cohen, 2010) whereas
audiences heavily rely on ideologically congruent, homogenous information sources
to the exclusion of all others, resulting in large ideologically driven perception gaps.
Scholarship across several disciplines has increasingly found the venerable maxim
that ‘‘everyone is entitled to their own opinion, but not their own facts’’ holds
less sway across large segments of the public with false beliefs difficult to correct
(e.g., Berinsky, 2012; Garrett, Nisbet, & Lynch, 2011; Nyhan&Reifler, 2010; Schwarz,
Sanna, Skurnik, & Yoon, 2007; World Public Opinion, 2006). The role of need
for closure in motivating selective exposure and attention to ideologically or value
congruent information and/or resisting corrective messages intended to update false
beliefs or misperceptions is a research area that deserves more explication.
Limitations
In light of our theoretical contributions of our findings, some key limitations of our
study should be noted. The strength of our study is that it was a multiwave online
experimentwith a nationally representative adult sample thatmaximized our external
validity and provided conservative estimates of attitude change. However, this strong
external validity was paired with some loss in internal control as the experiment
was conducted outside the lab and employed videos rather than relying on simple
textual stimuli. Furthermore, though our results are consistent with the cognitive
processes that we have outlined, we are unable to assess key cognitive processes
such as selective attention, motivation, need for cognition, or depth of processing
within the context of our research design. Thus, our study leaves some important
questions on the exact nature of the cognitive processes at work unanswered, but
in turn provides fodder for future research. Overall we believe that many of these
deficits were compensated for by the increased external validity of testing naturalistic
stimulus materials representing common competing message frames about climate
change that audiences are typically exposed to in public discourse.
Another question that remains is whether our findings are generalizable to
framing effects on topics other than climate change. Our design was limited by
not including stimulus sampling across different policy contexts. Moving forward,
replicating this study simultaneously across several policy contexts would provide
further evidence on how need for closure may or may not influence framing effects
in competitive message environments. In addition, manipulating frames to explicitly
focus on stability versus change, or inequality versus equality, may further elucidate
how need for closure moderates message effects when considering these competing
policy tradeoffs.
Implications
What lessons do our findings have for strategic communication about policy issues?
Our studywas not an attempt to simulate exposure to political advertising specifically,
either in terms of single-sided or two-sided messages. Rather, our study attempts to
experimentally simulate how exposure to competing frames inmass communication,
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broadly defined (e.g., news media, political discourse, etc.—see Chong and Druck-
man, 2007a), influences opinion formation about public policy. Our results suggest
framing effects on such a highly ideologically polarized, salient issue as climate
change are extremely difficult to induce, even when exposing audiences to frames in
a noncompetitive environment. However, our findings also imply that simultaneous
exposure to competing frames increases audience motivations to weigh a larger
set of applicable considerations when making policy judgments, especially when
communicating policy trade-offs or costs and/or benefits. In turn, this competitive
communication may lead to attitude change among some audience segments that
are more open-minded.
Three implications specific to strategic communication about climate change
also emerge. First, several scholars and practitioners have focused on segmenting
the public in terms of climate change communication across a range of dimensions
(e.g., Maibach, Roser-Renouf, & Leiserowitz, 2008). In this context, climate change
communicators may wish to focus on identifying which audience segments are more
likely to be ‘‘open-minded’’ than others and prioritize those segments for targeted
communications that stimulate greater consideration of the costs and benefits of
climate change mitigation. This strategy may be an effective means of inducing
attitude change that bridges some of the polarized ideological divide around the
issue.
A second implication is the need for more work on developing communication
strategies that may appeal to population segments with a greater need for closure. For
instance, just as open-minded individuals may be more responsive to pro-climate
mitigation frames that highlight benefits of changing the status quo, a question that
remains unanswered is whether closed-minded individuals would bemore responsive
to pro-climate mitigation messages that frame the issue in terms of maintaining the
status quo (e.g., in terms of economic status, social hierarchy, political power,
lifestyle, etc.). The work of Feygina, Jost, and Goldsmith (2010) on the influence
of system-justification orientations, a closely related construct to need for closure,
provides some empirical basis for this approach. Within their study the framing of
pro-environmental efforts as maintaining the status quo was an effective means to
increase support for signing a proenvironmental petition among individuals with
high system-justification tendencies. A similar approachmay work among those with
a high need for closure.
Lastly, in recent years scientists and environmental advocates have been concerned
that the so-called ‘‘climate denialist movement,’’ paired with negativemedia coverage
about climate science such as ‘‘Climategate,’’ have been negative influences on public
opinion toward climate mitigation (see Dunlap & McCright, 2011, for example).
This study indicates that such concern may be somewhat overstated. In fact, the
presence of competitive frames in public discourse may stimulate some segments
of the public to more carefully deliberate about the tradeoffs of climate change
policies, and consequently increase their support for climate mitigation rather than
diminish it.
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Notes
1 The web addresses for the stimuli are (a) environmental disaster
frame—http://youtu.be/IVNRA-UIytc, (b) national security
frame—http://youtu.be/PmODFzbV0kQ, (c) economic costs
frame—http://youtu.be/fvo7CVVBAHE.
2 Controls include age (M = 49.9, SD= 15.2), gender (50% women), and race (77% white).
Household income was measured on a 19-point scale with the median household income
$40,000–$49,999 (M = 10.3, SD= 2.0). Educational attainment was measured on a
14-point scale with the median attainment a high school diploma (M = 12.0, SD= 3.9).
Ideology was measured on a 7-point scale from very liberal to very conservative (M = 4.3,
SD= 1.5). Knowledge about climate change was gauged by five true/false questions
combined into an index ranging from zero to five (M = 2.0, SD= 1.24). Participants were
asked (a) ‘‘the hole in the ozone layer is the primary cause of global warming’’ (false), (b)
‘‘the average temperature of the earth has increased significantly in the last 100 years’’
(true), (c) ‘‘China is the largest emitter of carbon dioxide (the greenhouse gas that has
been linked to global warming) in the world’’ (true), (d) ‘‘greater output from the Sun
contributes to global warming more so than greenhouse gases produced by people’’ (false),
(e) ‘‘reducing human emissions of greenhouse gases will have an immediate effect on
global warming with average global temperatures dropping in just a few years’’ (false).
Agreement with ‘‘Global warming is happening, and is mostly caused by human activities’’
(49.5%) was included as a dichotomous variable.
3 Participants were asked whether they agree or disagree (a) ‘‘Even after I have made up my
mind about something, I am always eager to consider a different opinion,’’ (b) ‘‘When
thinking about a problem, I consider as many different opinions on the issue as possible,’’
(c) ‘‘I usually do not consult many different opinions before forming my own view’’
(reverse coded).
4 Participants were asked about support for eight policies: (a) ‘‘Create a ‘Cap and Trade’
policy that limits greenhouse gases said to cause global warming,’’ (b) ‘‘Do nothing to
directly address global warming but rather limit government regulation, spending, and
taxation in order to encourage economic growth’’ (reverse-coded), (c) ‘‘increase the
federal tax on gasoline by $.10 per gallon as a means to reduce oil dependence and carbon
emissions,’’ (d) ‘‘Increase mandatory government mileage standards for cars and trucks to
increase fuel efficiency,’’ (e) ‘‘develop a new international treaty on global climate change
that would replace the 1997 Kyoto Treaty and require the United States to cut its emissions
of carbon dioxide 80% by the year 2050,’’ (f) ‘‘increase government spending toward
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developing alternative energy and creating new ‘green’ jobs,’’ (g) ‘‘let the free market,
economic competition, and technology attempt to address global warming without
government action’’ (reverse coded), (h) ‘‘Create a ‘carbon tax’ that directly taxes
companies that emit greenhouse gases said to cause global warming with a fixed fee per ton
of pollutants released into the atmosphere.’’
5 Participants ranked the applicability of five considerations about government action on
climate change: (a) ‘‘Reducing U.S. reliance on foreign oil and support for foreign
terrorism,’’ (b) ‘‘Creating high-paying ‘green’ jobs and a new ‘green’ economy based on
alternative energy,’’ (c) ‘‘Preventing environmental disasters and saving endangered plants
and animals,’’ (d) ‘‘The economic costs of reducing carbon emissions and more
government regulations or taxes,’’ (e) ‘‘Whether global warming is primarily caused by
humans or by natural causes.’’
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